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In theory, the potential for credit risk diversiﬁcation for banks can be
considerable. Insofar as diﬀerent industries or sectors are more or less pro-
cyclical, banks can alter their lending policy and capital allocation across
those sectors. Similarly, internationally active banks are able to apply anal-
ogous changes across countries. In addition to such passive credit portfolio
management, ﬁnancial engineering—using instruments such as credit de-
rivatives—enables banks (and other ﬁnancial institutions) to engage in ac-
tivecredit portfolio management by buying and selling credit risk (or credit
protection) across sectors and countries. Credit exposure to the U.S. chem-
ical industry, for example, can be traded for credit exposure to the Korean
steel sector. One may, therefore, think of a global market for credit expo-
sures wherein credit risk can be exported and imported.
Within such a global context, default probabilities are driven primarily
by how ﬁrms are tied to fundamental risk factors, both domestic and for-
eign, and how those factors are linked across countries. In order to imple-
ment such a global approach in the analysis of credit risk, we have devel-
oped in Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004; hereafter PSW) a global
vector autoregressive macroeconometric model (GVAR) for a set of
twenty-ﬁve countries accounting for about 80 percent of world output.
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Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2005; hereafter PSTW)
relate asset returns for a portfolio of 119 ﬁrms to the global macroecono-
metric model, thus isolating macro eﬀects from idiosyncratic shocks as
they relate to default (and hence loss). The GVAR eﬀectively serves as the
macroeconomic engine capturing the economic environment faced by an
internationally active global bank. Domestic and foreign macroeconomic
variables are allowed to impact each ﬁrm diﬀerently. In this way we are able
to account for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity in an explicitly interdependent
global context. Developing such a conditional modeling framework is par-
ticularly important for the analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of shock
scenarios on credit risk, an important feature we exploit here.
In this paper we extend the analysis of PSTW along four dimensions.
First, we provide some analytical results on the limits of credit risk diversi-
ﬁcation. Second, we illustrate the impact of two diﬀerent identiﬁcation
restrictions regarding the default condition on the resulting loss distribu-
tions. Third, we use this framework to understand the degree of diversi-
ﬁcation, with ﬁve models that diﬀer in their degree of parameter hetero-
geneity, from fully homogeneous to allowing for industry and regional
heterogeneity but homogeneous factor sensitivities. Fourth, we have more
than doubled the number of ﬁrms in the portfolio, from 119 and 243 ﬁrms,
providing for more robust results and allowing us to explore the impor-
tance of exposure granularity. We go on to explore the impact of shocks to
real equity prices, interest rates, and real output on the resulting loss dis-
tribution as implied by the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
Such conditional analysis using shock scenarios from observable risk
factors is not possible in the most commonly used model in the credit risk
literature, namely the Vasicek (1987, 1991, 2002) adaptation of the Merton
(1974) default model. In addition to being driven by a single and unob-
served risk factor, this model also assumes that risk factor sensitivities,
analogous to capital asset pricing model (CAPM)–style betas, are the same
across all ﬁrms in all regions and industries, yielding a fully homogeneous
model. This single-factor model also underlies the risk-based capital stan-
dards in the New Basel Accord (BCBS 2004), as shown in Gordy (2003).
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level parameter heterogeneity and information about
credit ratings matter a great deal for capturing diﬀerences in the loss dis-
tributions. In line with theoretical and empirical results in Hanson, Pe-
saran, and Schuermann (2005; hereafter HPS), we show that neglected het-
erogeneity leads to underestimation of expected losses, and once those are
controlled for, to overestimation of unexpected losses. Wrongly imposing
homogeneity results in excessively skewed and fat-tailed loss distributions.
In the process of allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity, credit rating information
turns out to be particularly important, since default correlation and credit
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constant. These diﬀerences become more pronounced in the presence of
systematic risk factor shocks: increased parameter heterogeneity greatly
reduces shock sensitivity. For example, an adverse 2.33  shock to U.S. eq-
uity prices increases loss volatility by about 31 percent for the fully hetero-
geneous model, but by 73 percent for the homogeneous pooled model.
These diﬀerences become even more pronounced as shocks become more
extreme: for an adverse 5  shock to U.S. equity prices, loss volatility in-
creases by about 85 percent for the heterogeneous model, but by more than
240 percent for the restricted model.
We further ﬁnd that symmetric shocks result in asymmetric and non-
proportional loss outcomes due to the nonlinearity of the default model.
Loss increases arising from adverse shocks are larger than corresponding
loss decreases from benign (but equiprobable) shocks. Here too there are
important diﬀerences in the loss distributions depending on the degree of
underlying model heterogeneity. While all models exhibit this asymmetry
for expected losses and loss volatility, only the fully heterogeneous model
exhibits this particular asymmetric response in the tail of the loss distribu-
tion. For the restricted models the opposite is true: the reduction in tail risk
arising from the benign shock is larger than the corresponding increase due
to the adverse shock. By imposing homogeneity, not only are the relative
loss responses exaggerated (most of the percentage increases and all of the
decreases are larger for the restricted than for the unrestricted model), but
perceived reduction of risk in the tail of the loss distribution tends to be
overly optimistic. Failing to properly account for parameter heterogeneity
could therefore result in too much implied risk capital.
Both the baseline and shock-conditional loss distributions seem to
change noticeably with the addition of heterogeneous factor loadings. Al-
lowing for regional heterogeneity appears to be more important than al-
lowing for industry or sector heterogeneity. However, the biggest marginal
change arises when allowing for full heterogeneity.
The apparently innocuous choice of identifying restriction—same de-
fault threshold versus same unconditional probability of default (or dis-
tance to default), by credit rating—appears to make a material diﬀerence.
Under the same threshold (by rating) restriction, conditioning on risk fac-
tor forecasts changes ﬁrm default probabilities only somewhat: uncondi-
tional and conditional probabilities of default are highly correlated (96
percent). By contrast, such conditioning has a signiﬁcant impact under the
same distance to default (by rating) restriction. The conditional default
probabilities disperse, resulting in a lower correlation with unconditional
default probabilities (79 percent).
We ﬁnd that the loss distributions are relatively insensitive to typical
business cycle shocks arising from changes in interest rates or real output.
Furthermore, these results seem to be reasonably robust to the choice of
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policy implications, particularly given the intense debate surrounding the
possible procyclicality of the New Basel Accord (Carpenter, Whitesell, and
Zakrajs ˇek 2001, Altman, Bharath, and Saunders 2002, Carey 2002, Allen
and Saunders 2004).
Finally, we are able to assess the impact of granularity or portfolio size
on the risk of the portfolio for a simpliﬁed version of the model where an-
alytic solutions for unexpected loss (UL) are available. The lower the aver-
age correlation across ﬁrm returns, the greater is the potential for diversi-
ﬁcation. But to achieve the theoretical (asymptotic) lower bound to the
UL, a relatively large N is required when return correlations are low. A
common rule of thumb for return diversiﬁcation of a portfolio of equities
is around 50. Default correlations are, of course, much lower than return
correlations, and we show that to come within 3 percent of the asymptotic
UL values, more than 5,000 ﬁrms are needed. Thus credit portfolios or
credit derivatives such as CDOs, which contain rather fewer numbers of
ﬁrms, most likely would still retain a signiﬁcant degree of idiosyncratic
risk. In the case, for instance, of our more modestly sized portfolio of 243
ﬁrms, the UL is some 44 percent above its asymptotic value.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: section 9.2 provides
a model of ﬁrm value and default. Section 9.3 covers some useful analyti-
cal results for the loss distribution of a credit portfolio. Section 9.4 pre-
sents the framework for conditional credit risk modeling including a brief
overview of the global macroeconometric model. In section 9.5 we intro-
duce the credit portfolio and present the results from the multifactor return
regressions that link ﬁrm returns to the observable systematic risk factors
from the macroeconomic engine. We present results for ﬁve models, rang-
ing from the homogeneous pooled model to one allowing for full hetero-
geneity, with intermediate speciﬁcations that allow for industry and geo-
graphy eﬀects. In section 9.6 we consider how those models impact the
resulting loss distributions under a variety of macroeconomic shock sce-
narios. In this section we also consider the impact of portfolio size and
granularity on the resulting loss distribution. Some concluding remarks
are provided in section 9.7.
9.2 Firm Value and Default
Most credit default models have two basic components: (1) a model of
the ﬁrm value, and (2) conditions under which default occurs.1 In this sec-
tion we set out such a model by adapting the option theoretic default model
(Merton 1974) to our global macroeconometric speciﬁcation of the sys-
tematic factors. Merton recognized that a lender is eﬀectively writing a put
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1. This section follows the approach introduced in PSTW.option on the assets of the borrowing ﬁrm; owners and owner-managers
(i.e., shareholders) hold the call option. If the value of the ﬁrm falls below
a certain threshold, the owners will put the ﬁrm to the debtholders. Thus a
ﬁrm is expected to default when the value of its assets falls below a thresh-
old value determined by its liabilities. In this way default risk is expected to
vary across ﬁrms due to diﬀerences in leverage or volatility. While the lat-
ter is typically estimated using market data, the former is often measured
using balance sheet data, which is noisy and prone to manipulation.
The problem of modeling ﬁrm default is that it inherits all the asymmet-
ric information and agency problems between borrower and lender, well
known in the banking literature. The argument is roughly as follows. A
ﬁrm, particularly if it is young and privately held, knows more about its
health, quality, and prospects than outsiders—for example, lenders. Banks
are particularly well suited to help overcome these informational asymme-
tries through relationship lending; learning by lending. Moreover, man-
agers and owners of ﬁrms have an incentive to substitute higher risk for
lower risk investments as they are able to receive upside gains (they hold 
a call option on the ﬁrm’s assets) while lenders are not (they hold a put
option). See the survey by James and Smith (2000) for a more extensive
discussion, as well as Garbade (2001). If the ﬁrm is public, we have other
sources of information, such as quarterly and annual reports which,
though accounting based, are then digested and interpreted by the market.
Stock and bond prices serve as summary statistics of that information.
The scope for credit risk diversiﬁcation thus can manifest itself through
two channels: how ﬁrm value reacts to changes in the systematic risk fac-
tors, and through diﬀerentiated default thresholds. Both channels need to
be modeled. Since we shall be concerned with possibilities of diversiﬁca-
tion along the dimensions of geography and industry (or sector), we will
consider ﬁrms j, j   1, . . . , N, in country or region i, i   1, . . . , M, and
sector s, s 1, . . . , S, and denote the ﬁrm’s asset value at the end of period
t by V jis,t, and its outstanding stock of debt by D jis,t. According to Merton’s
model, default occurs at the maturity date of the debt, t   H, when the
ﬁrm’s assets, V jis,t H, are less than the face value of the debt at that time,
Djis,t H. This is in contrast with the ﬁrst-passage model, where default
would occur the ﬁrst time that V jis,t falls below a default boundary (or
threshold) over the period tto t H.2Under both models the default prob-
abilities are computed with respect to the probability distribution of asset
values at the terminal date—t   H in the case of the original Merton
model—and over the period from t to t   H in the case of the ﬁrst-passage
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2. See Black and Cox (1976). More recent modeling approaches include direct strategic de-
fault considerations (e.g., Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997]). Leland and Toft (1996) de-
velop a model wherein default is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a
positive net worth condition. For a review of these models, see, for example, Lando (2004,
chapter 3).models. Although our approach can be adapted to the ﬁrst-passage model,
for simplicity we follow the Merton approach here.
We follow the approach developed in detail in PSTW, where default is
said to occur if the value of equity, Ejis,t H, falls below a possibly small but
positive threshold value, Cjis,t H,
(1) Ejis,t H   Cjis,t H.
This is reasonable since technical default deﬁnitions used by banks and
bondholders are typically weaker than outright bankruptcy. Moreover, be-
cause bankruptcies are costly and violations to the absolute priority rule in
bankruptcy proceedings are so common, in practice the debtholders have
an incentive to put the ﬁrm into receivership even before the equity value
of the ﬁrm hits the zero value. The default point could vary over time and
with the ﬁrm’s particular characteristics (region and sector being two of
them, of course). It is, however, diﬃcult to measure, since observable
accounting-based factors are at best noisy and at worst reported with bias,
highlighting the information asymmetry between managers (agents) and
shareholders and debtholders (principals).3
To overcome these measurement diﬃculties and information asymme-
tries, we make use of a ﬁrm’s credit rating R ∈        ,   ,  .... 4 This
will help us speciﬁcally in nailing down the default threshold, details of
which are given in section 9.2.1. Naturally, rating agencies have access to,
and presumably make use of, private information about the ﬁrm to arrive
at their ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit rating, in addition to incorporating public in-
formation such as, for instance, ﬁnancial statements and equity returns.
To simplify the exposition here we adopt the standard practice and as-
sume that asset values follow a Gaussian geometric random walk with a
ﬁxed drift.
ln(Ejis,t 1/Ejist)   rjis,t 1    jis    jisεjis,t 1,
where εjis,t 1 ~ N(0, 1), distributed independently across t (but not neces-
sarily across ﬁrms,  jis is the return innovation volatility and  jis the drift 
of the one-period holding return, rjis,t 1). This speciﬁcation is “uncondi-
tional” in the sense that it does not allow for the eﬀects of business cycle
and monetary policy variables on returns (and hence defaults). We shall re-
turn to conditional asset return speciﬁcations that allow for such eﬀects in
section 9.2.2. The distribution of the H-period ahead holding period re-
turn associated with the previous speciﬁcation is then given by
(2) rjis(t, t   H)  ∑
H
  1
rjis,t r~ N(H jis,  H    jis),
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3. Duﬃe and Lando (2001), with this in mind, allow for imperfect information about the
ﬁrm’s assets and default threshold in the context of a ﬁrst-passage model.
4. For an overview of the rating industry, see Cantor and Packer (1995). For no reason other
than convenience, we shall be using the ratings nomenclature used by Standard & Poor’s and
Fitch.where the notation (t, t   H) is used throughout to mean over the period
“from t   1 to t   H.”
Default then occurs at the end of H periods if the H-period change in
ﬁrm value (or return) falls below the log threshold-equity ratio, or return
default threshold, as in
ln     ln   ,
or
rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H).
Therefore, using equation (2), the ﬁrm’s probability of default (PD) at the
terminal date t   H is given by
(3)  jis(t, t   H)      ,
where  ( ) is the distribution function of the standard normal variate. The
argument of  ( ) in equation (3) is sometimes called the distance to default
(DD). We may rewrite the H-period forward return default threshold as
 jis(t, t   H)   H jis     1[ jis(t, t   H)] jis H  .
where  –1( jis[t, t   H]) is the quantile associated with the default proba-
bility  jis(t, t   H). The ﬁrm defaults if its H-period return, rjis(t, t   H),
falls below its expected H-period return, less a multiple of its H-period
volatility.5
9.2.1 Identiﬁcation of the Default Threshold
In this section we provide a brief discussion of the problem of identify-
ing the default threshold for each ﬁrm. Details can be found in Hanson,
Pesaran, and Schuermann (2005). In what follows we shall be suppressing
the country and sector subscript for simplicity. Suppose now that at time t
we have a portfolio of size Nt of ﬁrms, or credit exposures to those ﬁrms,
and denote the exposure share or weight for the jthﬁrm a wjt   0 such that
ΣNt
j 1 wjt   1.6 At time t the expected portfolio default rate at the end of 
H-periods from now (e.g., one year) is then given by
(4)  (t, t   H)  ∑
Nt
j 1
wjt    .
Relation (4) may be thought of as a moment estimator for the unknown
thresholds  j(t, t   H), since  j and  j and  (t, t   H) can be estimated
 j(t, t   H)   H j   
 j H  
 jis(t, t   H)   H jis    
 jis H  
Cjis,t H  
Ejis,t
Ejis,t H  
Ejis,t
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5. Note that  –1) jis[t, t   H]) is negative for  jis(t, t   H)   0.5, which covers the default
probability values typically considered in the literature.
6. Note that we are disallowing short positions, which is not very restrictive for credit assets.from past observed returns and realized defaults. With one moment con-
dition and Nt unknown thresholds, one needs to impose Nt – 1 identifying
restrictions; for example, one could impose the same threshold for every
ﬁrm in the portfolio. The number of required identifying restrictions could
be reduced if further information can be used. One such type of informa-
tion is provided by credit rating-speciﬁc default information.
Although ﬁrm-speciﬁc default probabilities,  j(t, t   H), are not ob-
servable, the default rate by rating,  R(t, t   H), can be estimated by pool-
ing historical observations of ﬁrms’ defaults in a particular rating class, us-
ing a sample spanning t   1, . . . , T. In this case the number of identifying
restrictions can be reduced to NT– k, where kdenotes the number of rating
categories, and NTthe number of ﬁrms in the portfolio at time T. There are
two simple ways that identiﬁcation can be achieved. One could, for ex-
ample, impose the same distance to default on all ﬁrms in the same rating
category, namely
(5)   DDR(T, T   H)  j ∈ R,
where   ˆ
j(T, T H) is the default threshold estimated on the basis of infor-
mation available at time T, and    j and    j are sample estimates of (uncon-
ditional) mean and standard deviations of one-period holding returns ob-
tained over the period t   1, 2, . . . , T. Then, with estimates of default
frequencies by rating in hand, namely   ˆR(T, T   H), we are able to obtain
an estimate of DDR(T, T   H) given by7
(6) Dˆ D R(T, T   H)     1[  ˆR(T, T   H)],
and hence the ﬁrm-speciﬁc default thresholds
(7)   ˆ
j(T, T   H)      j H    1[  ˆR(T, T   H)]   H   j.
Note that imposing the same DD by rating as in (5) imposes the same un-
conditional PD for each R-rated ﬁrm, as in (6), but allows for variation in
the estimated default thresholds   ˆ
j(T, T   H) across ﬁrms within a rating
because of diﬀerent unconditional means and standard deviations of re-
turns, as in (7). Note also that each element on the right-hand side of (7) is
horizon dependent, making the default threshold horizon dependent.
Alternatively, one could impose the restriction that the default threshold
  ˆ
j(T, T   H) is the same across ﬁrms in the same rating category:
(8)   ˜
j(T, T   H)    ˆ
R(T, T   H)  j ∈ R,
which, when substituted into equation (4), now yields
  ˆ
j(T, T   H)   H   j    
    j H  
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7. Condition (5) implies that all ﬁrms with rating R have the same unconditional distance
to default and hence the same unconditional default probability, as in equation (6).(9)   ˆR(T, T   H)  ∑
j∈R
wj,T    .
This is a nonlinear equation that needs to be solved numerically for   ˆ
R(T,
T H). Condition (9) implies that DD, and hence unconditional PDs, will
vary across ﬁrms within a rating, since   ˆ
R(T, T H) is chosen such that on
average the PD by ﬁrm with rating R is equal to   ˆR(T, T   H).
9.2.2 Firm-Speciﬁc Conditional Defaults
For the credit risk analysis of diﬀerent shock scenarios it is important to
distinguish between conditional and unconditional default probabilities.
For the conditional analysis we assume that conditional on the informa-
tion available at time t,  t, and as before the return of ﬁrm j in region i and
sector s over the period t to t   H, rjis(t, t   H)   ln(Ejis,t H/Ejis,t), can be
decomposed as
(10) rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H),
where  jis(t, t   H) is the (forecastable) conditional mean (H-step ahead),
and  jis(t, t   H) is the (nonforecastable) component of the return process
over the period tto t H. It may contain ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic as well
as systematic risk factor innovations. We shall assume that
(11)  jis(t, t   H) ~ N[0,  2
jis(t, t   H)].
We can now characterize the separation between a default and a nonde-
fault state with an indicator variable zjis(t, t   H),
(12) zjis(t, t   H)   I[rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H)],
such that,
(13) zjis(t, t   H)   1 if rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H) ⇒ Default,
zjis(t, t   H)   0 if rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H) ⇒ No Default.
Using the same approach, the H-period ahead conditional default proba-
bility for ﬁrm j is given by
(14)  jis(t, t   H)      .
We can estimate  jis(t, t   H) and  jis(t, t   H) using the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mul-
tifactor regressions using a sample ending in period T. In what follows we
denote these estimates by   ˆ jis(T, T   H) and   ˆjis(T, T   H), respectively.
The default thresholds,  jis(T, T   H), can be estimated, following the dis-
cussion in section 9.2.1, by imposing either the same distance to default by
rating, DDR(T, T H), as in equation (5), or the same default threshold by
rating, as in equation (8). Speciﬁcally, under the same DD by rating, the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc conditional PD will be given by
 jis(t, t   H)    jis(t, t   H)
   
 jis(t, t   H)
  ˆ
R(T, T   H)   H   j    
    j H  
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    .
Under the same default threshold by rating we have
(16)   ˆjis(T, T   H)      ,
where   ˆ
R(T, T   H) is determined by (9).
Similarly, in the case of the same DD by rating, the empirical default
condition for ﬁrm j with credit rating R can now be written as
(17) I[rjis(T, T   H)    ˆ
jis(T, T   H)]   1 if rjis(T, T   H) 
     jis H    1[  ˆR(T, T   H)]   H   jis,
and in the case of the same default threshold by rating the default condi-
tion will be
(18) I[rjis(T, T   H)    ˆ
R(T, T   H)]   1 if rjis(T, T   H)    ˆ
R(T, T   H),
where, as before,   ˆ
R(T, T H) is given as the solution to equation (9). Note
that in the case of (18) there are only as many default thresholds as there
are credit ratings, whereas in the case of equation (17) each default thresh-
old is ﬁrm speciﬁc (through    jis and     jis).
Mappings from credit ratings to default probabilities are typically ob-
tained using corporate bond rating histories over many years, often twenty
years or more, and thus represent averages across business cycles. The rea-
son for such long samples is simple: default events for investment grade
ﬁrms are quite rare; for example, the annual default probability even for an
 -rated ﬁrm is approximately one basis point for both Moody’s and S&P-
rated ﬁrms (see, for example, Jafry and Schuermann 2004). Accordingly,
we will make the further identifying assumption that credit ratings are
“cycle-neutral,” in the sense that ratings are assigned only on the basis of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and not on systematic or macroeconomic infor-
mation. On this interpretation of credit ratings see also Saunders and Allen
(2002) and Amato and Furﬁne (2004).
Given suﬃcient data for a particular region or country i (the United
States comes to mind) or sector s, one could in principle consider default
probabilities that vary over those dimensions as well. However, since a par-
ticular ﬁrm j’s default is only observable once, multiple (serial) bankrupt-
cies notwithstanding, it makes less sense to allow   to vary across j.8 Em-
  ˆ
R(T, T   H)    ˆ jis(T, T   H)
    
  ˆ  jis(T, T   H)
   jis H    1[  ˆR(T, T   H)]   H   jis    ˆ jis(T, T   H)
      
  ˆjis(T, T,   H)
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8. To be sure, one is not strictly prevented from obtaining ﬁrm-speciﬁc default probabilities
estimates at a given point in time. The bankruptcy models of Altman (1968), Lennox (1999)
and Shumway (2001) are such examples, as is the industry model by KMV (Kealhofer andpirically, then, we abstract from possible variation in default rates across
regions and sectors, so that probabilities of default vary only across credit
ratings and over time.
Finally, another important source of heterogeneity that could be of par-
ticular concern for out multicountry analysis is the diﬀerences that prevail
in bankruptcy laws and regulations across countries. However, by using
rating agency default data, which, broadly speaking, are based on homo-
geneous deﬁnition of default, we expect our analysis to be reasonably ro-
bust to such heterogeneities.
9.3 Credit Loss Distribution
The complicated relationship between return correlations and defaults
manifests itself at the portfolio level.9Consider a credit portfolio composed
of Ndiﬀerent credit assets such as loans at date t, and for simplicity assume
that loss given default (LGD) is 100 percent, meaning that no recovery is
made in the event of default. Then we may deﬁne loss as a fraction of total
exposure by




where wj is the exposure share, where wj   0 and ΣN
j 1 wj   1, and zj,t 1  
I(rj,t 1    jt), with  jt assumed as given.10 Under the Vasicek model








where   E(zj,t 1), which is the same for all ﬁrms, and  ∗is the default cor-
relation,
(20)  ∗( ,  )   ,
where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of ft 1, as-
sumed here to beN(0, 1).11For example, for   0.01, and   0.30, we have
 ∗   0.05. Since ΣN
j 1 wj   1, it is easily seen that
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Kurbat 2002). However, all of these studies focus on just one country at a time (the United
States and United Kingdom in this list) and do not address the formidable challenges of
point-in-time bankruptcy forecasting with a multicountry portfolio.
9. This section presents a synopsis of results developed in detail in Hanson, Pesaran, and
Schuermann (2005).
10. To simplify the notations and without loss of generality, in this section we assume Nand
the exposure weights are time invariant.







wjwj    1,
and hence










2 → 0, as N →  ,
which is often referred to as the granularity condition; the second term in
brackets in equation (21) becomes negligible as N becomes very large, and
Var( N,t 1) converges to the ﬁrst term, which will be nonzero for  ∗   0.
Hence, in the limit the unexpected loss is bounded by   (1 –    ) ∗  . For a
ﬁnite value of N, the unexpected loss is minimized by adopting an equal
weighted portfolio, with wj 1/N. Full diversiﬁcation is possible only in the
extreme case where  ∗   0 (which is implied by   1), and assuming that
the granularity condition is satisﬁed.
The loss distribution associated with this homogeneous model is derived
in Vasicek (1991, 2002) and Gordy (2000). Not surprisingly, Vasicek’s lim-
iting (as N →  ) distribution is also fully determined in terms of   and  .
The former parameter sets the expected loss of the portfolio, while the lat-
ter controls the shape of the loss distribution. In eﬀect one parameter,  ,
controls all aspects of the loss distribution: its volatility, skewness, and kur-
tosis. It would not be possible to calibrate two Vasicek loss distributions
with the same expected and unexpected losses, but with diﬀerent degrees
of fat-tailedness, for example.12
Further, Vasicek’s distribution does not depend on the portfolio weights
so long as equation (22) is satisﬁed. Therefore, for suﬃciently large portfo-
lios that satisfy the granularity condition, equation (22), there is no further
scope for credit risk diversiﬁcation if attention is conﬁned to the homoge-
neous return model that underlies Vasicek’s loss distribution. Also, Va-
sicek’s setup does not allow conditional risk modeling where the eﬀects of
macroeconomic shocks on credit loss distribution might be of interest.
With these considerations in mind, we allow for systematic factors and het-
erogeneity along several dimensions. These are: (1) multiple and observ-
able factors, (2) ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, (3) diﬀerentiated default thresholds, and
(4) diﬀerentiated factor sensitivities (analogous to ﬁrm betas) by region,
sector, or even ﬁrm-speciﬁc. If the Vasicek model lies at the fully homoge-
neous end of the spectrum, the model laid out in section 9.2 describes the
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12. The literature on modeling correlated defaults has been growing enormously. For a re-
cent survey, see Lando (2004, chapter 9).fully heterogeneous end. How much does accounting for heterogeneity
matter for credit risk? The outcomes we are interested in exploring are
diﬀerent measures of credit risk, be it means or volatilities of credit losses
(expected and unexpected losses in the argot of risk management), as well
as quantiles in the tails or value-at-risk (VaR). Before we are able to answer
some of these questions we ﬁrst need to introduce the macroeconomic or
systematic risk model that we plan to utilize in our empirical analysis.
9.4 Conditional Credit Modeling
9.4.1 The Macroeconomic Engine: Global Vector
Autoregression (GVAR)
The conditional loss distribution of a given credit portfolio can be de-
rived by linking up the return processes of individual ﬁrms, initially pre-
sented in equation (10), explicitly to the macro and global variables in the
GVAR model. The macroeconomic engine driving the credit risk model 
is described in detail in PSW. We only provide a very brief, nontechnical
overview here. The GVAR is a global quarterly model estimated over the
period 1979Q1–1999Q1 comprising a total of twenty-ﬁve countries, which
are grouped into eleven regions (shown in bold in table 9.1 from PSTW,
reproduced here for convenience). The advantage of the GVAR is that it
allows for a true multicountry setting; however, it can become computa-
tionally demanding very quickly. For that reason we model the seven key
economies of the United States, Japan, China, Germany, United King-
dom, France, and Italy as regions of their own while grouping the other
eighteen countries into four regions.13 The output from these countries
comprises around 80 percent of world GDP (in 1999).
In contrast to existing modeling approaches, in the GVAR the use of
cointegration is not conﬁned to a single country or region. By estimating a
cointegrating model for each country/region separately, the model also al-
lows for endowment and institutional heterogeneities that exist across the
diﬀerent countries. Accordingly, speciﬁc vector error-correcting models
(VECM) are estimated for individual countries (or regions) by relating
domestic macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inﬂation, equity prices,
money supply, exchange rates, and interest rates to corresponding, and
therefore country-speciﬁc, foreign variables constructed exclusively to
match the international trade pattern of the country/region under consid-
eration. By making use of speciﬁc exogeneity assumptions regarding the
“rest of the world” with respect to a given domestic or regional economy,
the GVAR makes eﬃcient use of limited amounts of data and presents a
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13. See PSW, section 9.8, for details on cross-country aggregation into regions.consistently estimated global model for use in portfolio applications and
beyond.14
The GVAR allows for interactions to take place between factors and
economies through three distinct but interrelated channels:
• Contemporaneous dependence of domestic on foreign variables and
their lagged values
• Dependence of country-speciﬁc variables on observed common
global eﬀects such as oil prices
• Weak cross-sectional dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks
The individual models are estimated allowing for unit roots and co-
integration assuming that region-speciﬁc foreign variables are weakly ex-
ogenous, with the exception of the model for the U.S. economy, which is
treated as a closed-economy model. The U.S. model is linked to the outside
world through exchange rates, which in turn are themselves determined by
the rest of the region-speciﬁc models. PSW show that the careful construc-
tion of the global variables as weighted averages of the other regional vari-
ables leads to a simultaneous system of regional equations that may be
solved to form a global system. They also provide theoretical arguments as
well as empirical evidence in support of the weak exogeneity assumption
that allows the region-speciﬁc models to be estimated consistently.
The conditional loss distribution of a given credit portfolio can now be
derived by linking up the return processes of individual ﬁrms, initially pre-
sented in equation (10), explicitly to the macro and global variables in the
GVAR model. We provide a synopsis of the model developed in full detail
in PSTW.
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14. For a more updated version of the GVAR model that covers a longer period and a larger
number of countries see Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2005). This version also pro-
vides a theoretical framework wherein the GVAR is derived as an approximation to a global,
unobserved common-factor model.
Table 9.1 Countries/Regions in the GVAR model
United Kingdom Germany Italy France
Western Europe Southeast Asia Latin America Middle East
Belgium Indonesia Argentina Kuwait
Netherlands Korea Brazil Saudi Arabia




United States Japan China9.4.2 Firm Returns Based on Observed 
Common Factors Linked to GVAR
Here we extend the ﬁrm return model by incorporating the full dynamic
structure of the systematic risk factors captured by the GVAR. We present
a notationally simpliﬁed version of the model outlined in detail in PSTW.
Accordingly, a ﬁrm’s return is assumed to be a function of changes in the
underlying macroeconomic factors (domestic and foreign), the exogenous
global variables (in our application, oil prices) and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc idio-
syncratic shocks  jis,t  :
(23) rjis,t      jis      jisft      jis,t  , t   1, 2, . . . , T,
where  jis,t  ~ i.i.d.N(0, 1),   1, 2, . . . , H, rjis,t  is the equity return of ﬁrm
j(j 1, . . . , nci) in region iand sector s,  jisis a regression constant (or ﬁrm
alpha),  jisare the factor loadings (ﬁrm “betas”), and ft  collects all the ob-
served macroeconomic variables plus oil prices in the global model (total-
ing sixty-four in PSW). To be sure, these return regressions are not predic-
tion equations per se, as they depend on contemporaneous variables.
The GVAR model provides forecasts of all the global variables that di-
rectly or indirectly aﬀect the returns. As a result, default correlation enters
through the shared set of common factors, ft  , and the factor loadings,  jis.
If the model captures all systematic risk, the idiosyncratic risk components
of any two companies in the model would be uncorrelated; namely, the
idiosyncratic risks ought to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated. In practice,
of course, it will be hard to absorb all of the cross-section correlation with
the systematic risk factors modeled by the GVAR.
Note that we started by decomposing ﬁrm returns into forecastable and
nonforecastable components in equation (10), namely rjis(t, t   H)    jis(t,
t   H)    jis(t, t   H). In the case of the previous speciﬁcation we have
rjis(t, t   H)   H jis      jis∑
H
  1
ft      jis∑
H
  1
 jis,t  ,
and as an illustration assuming a ﬁrst-order vector autoregression for the
common factors:
ft      ft  –1   vt  ,
we have15
(25)  jis(t, t   H)   H jis      jis ∑
H
  1
   ft,
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15. Note that for a pure random walk,     0, and conditional and unconditional returns
processes are identical.and
(26)  jis(t, t   H)      jis ∑
H
  1
 H  vt       jis∑
H
  1
 jis,t  ,
where
  H     I       ...      H  .
The composite innovation  jis(t, t   H) contains the idiosyncratic innova-
tion  jis,t  , and common macro innovations from the GVAR, here repre-
sented by vt  , for   1, 2, . . . , H. The predictable component is likely to
be weak and will depend on the size of the factor loadings,  jis, and the ex-
tent to which the underlying global variables are cointegrating. In the ab-
sence of any cointegrating relations in the global model, none of the asset
returns are predictable. As it happens, the econometric evidence presented
in PSW strongly supports the existence of thirty-six cointegrating relations
in the sixty-three-equation global model and is, therefore, compatible with
some degree of predictability in asset returns, at least at the quarterly hori-
zon modeled here. The extent to which asset returns are predicted could re-
ﬂect time-varying risk premia and does not necessarily imply market in-
eﬃciencies. Our modeling approach provides an operational procedure for
relating excess returns of individual ﬁrms to all the observable macrofac-
tors in the global economy.
9.4.3 Expected Loss Due to Default
Given the value change process for ﬁrm j, deﬁned by (23), with  jis(T, T
  H) and  jis(T, T   H) by (25) and (26), and the return default threshold,
  ˆ
R(T, T   H), obtainable from an initial credit rating (see section 9.2), we
are now in a position to compute (conditional) expected loss. Suppose we
have data for ﬁrms and systematic factors in the GVAR for a sample period
t   1, . . . , T. We need to deﬁne the expected loss to ﬁrm j at time T   H,
given information available to the lender (e.g., a bank) at time T, which we
assume is given by  T. Default occurs when the ﬁrm’s return falls below the
return default threshold   ˆ
jis(T, T   H) or   ˜
jis(T, T   H) deﬁned by (7) and
(8), depending on the scheme used to identify the thresholds. Expected loss
at time T(and realized at T H), ET (Ljis,T H)  E(Ljis,T H⏐ T), is given by
(using   ˜
jis[T, T   H]    ˆ
R[T, T   H], for j ∈ R, for example) and
(27) ET(Ljis,T H)   Pr[ jis(T, T   H)    ˜
jis(T, T   H) 
   jis(T, T   H) ⏐  T]   Ajis,T   ET( jis,T H),
where Ajis,T is the exposure assuming no recoveries (typically the face value
of the loan) and is known at time T, and  jis,T H is the percentage of expo-
sure which cannot be recovered in the event of default or loss given default
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treated as a random variable over the unit interval. In what follows we
make the simplifying assumption that LGD is 100 percent.
Substituting equation (23) into equation (27) we obtain:
(28) ET(Ljis,T H)    jis(T, T   H)   Ajis,T,
where
 jis(T, T   H)   Pr[ jis(T, T   H)    ˜
jis(T, T   H)    jis(T, T   H)⏐ T].
is the conditional default probability over the period T to T   H, formed
at time T. Under the assumption that the macro and the idiosyncratic
shocks are normally distributed and that the parameter estimates are
given, we have the following expression for the probability of default over
T   T   H formed at T16
(29)  jis(T, T   H)      ,
where   jis(T, T   H)    Var[    jis(T, T    H)⏐   T]  . Exact expressions for
 jis(t, t   H) and    jis(t, t   H) will depend on the nature of the global
model used to identify the macro innovations. In the case of the illustrative
example given in equation (29), we have
V ar[ jis(T, T   H)⏐ T]      jis ∑
H
  1
  H   v   H    jis   H 2
jis,
where  v is the covariance matrix of the common shocks, vt. The relevant
expressions for  jis(T, T   H) and    jis(T, T   H) in the case of the GVAR
model are provided in the supplement to PSTW.
The expected loss due to default of a loan (credit) portfolio can now be
computed by aggregating the expected losses across the diﬀerent loans. De-
noting the loss of a loan portfolio over the period T to T   H by LT H we
have





 jis(T, T   H)   Ajis,T,
where nciis the number of obligors (which could be zero) in the bank’s loan
portfolio resident in country/region i.
Finally, note that  jis,T is the explained or expected component of ﬁrm j’s
return, obtained from the multiperiod GVAR forecasts, which in general
could depend on macroeconomic shocks worldwide. Thus, although indi-
  ˜
jis(T, T   H)    jis(T, T   H)
    
   jis(T, T   H)
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16. Joint normality is suﬃcient but not necessary for  jis(T, T   H) to be approximately
normally distributed. This is because  jis(T, T   H) is a linear function of a larger number of
weakly correlated shocks (63 in our particular application).vidual ﬁrms operate in a particular country/region i, their probability of
default can be aﬀected by global macroeconomic conditions.
9.4.4 Simulation of the Loss Distribution
The expected loss as well as the entire loss distribution can be computed
once the GVAR model parameters, the return process parameters in equa-
tion (23), and the thresholds using either equations (7) or (8) have been es-
timated for a sample of observations t   1, 2, . . . , T. We do this by sto-
chastic simulation, using draws from the joint distribution of the shocks,
 jis(T, T   H), which is assumed to have a conditional normal distribution
with variance  2
 jis(T, T   H).
Denote the bth draw of this vector by  jis
(b)(T, T   H), and compute the
H-period ﬁrm-speciﬁc return, rijs
(b)(T, T   H), noting that
(31) rijs
(b)(T, T   H)    jis(T, T   H)    jis
(b)(T, T   H),
where  jis(T, T   H) is derived from the GVAR forecasts (along the lines
of equation [25]), and
(32)  jis
(b)(T, T   H)    jis,H Z0
(b)    jis H  Zjis
(b)
is the composite innovation, where Z0
(b) and Zjis
(b) are independent draws
from N(0, 1). The loading coeﬃcients  jis,H and  jis H   are determined by
the parameters of the GVAR and the coeﬃcients of the asset return re-
gressions, equation (23). In the case of the GVAR model, the relevant ex-
pressions for the simulation of the multiperiod returns are provided in sec-
tion B of the supplement to PSTW.
Note that Z0
(b)is shared by all ﬁrms for a given draw b. Details on the der-
ivation of  jis,H for the GVAR model can be found in PSTW. The idiosyn-
cratic portion of the innovation is composed of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility,
 jis, estimated using a sample ending in periods T, and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc stan-
dard normal draw, Zjis
(b). One may then simulate the loss at the end of period
T   H using (known) loan face values, Ajis,T, as exposures:
(33) L(b)






(b)(T, T   H)    ˜
jis(T, T   H)]Ajis,T.
The simulated expected loss due to default is given by (using Breplications)






ET(LT H), as B →  .
The simulated loss distribution is given by ordered values of L(b)
T H, for b  
1, 2, . . . , B. For desired percentile, for example the 99 percent, and a given
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9.5.1 The Credit Portfolio
To analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, parameter ho-
mogeneity versus heterogeneity, we construct a ﬁctitious large-corporate
loan portfolio. This portfolio is an extended version of that used in PSTW
and is summarized in table 9.2. It contains a total of 243 companies, resi-
dent in twenty-one countries across ten of the eleven regions in the GVAR
model. In order for a ﬁrm to enter our sample, several criteria had to be
met. We restricted ourselves to major, publicly traded ﬁrms with a credit
rating from either Moody’s or S&P. Thus, for example, Chinese companies
were not included for lack of a credit rating. The ﬁrms should be repre-
sented within the major equity index for that country. We favored ﬁrms for
which equity return data was available for the entire sample period, that is,
going back to 1979. Typically this would exclude large ﬁrms such as tele-
phone operators, which in many instances have been privatized only re-
cently, even though they may represent a signiﬁcant share in their country’s
dominant equity index today. The data source is Datastream, and we took
their Total Return Index variable, which is a cum dividend return measure.
The third column in table 9.2 indicates the inception of the equity series
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Table 9.2 The composition of the sample portfolio by regions
No. of Equity seriesa Credit ratingb Portfolio
Region obligors quarterly range exposure (%)
United States 63 1979Q1–99Q1     to    –2 0
United Kingdom 24 1979Q1–99Q1    to    +8
Germany 21 1979Q1–99Q1     to    –1 0
France 15 1979Q1–99Q1    to     8
Italy 10 1979Q1–99Q1   to    –8
Western Europe 24 1979Q1–99Q1     to    +1 1
Middle East 4 1990Q3–99Q1  –2
Southeast Asia 34 1989Q3–99Q1   to   14
Japan 35 1979Q1–99Q1     to  +1 4
Latin America 14 1989Q3–99Q1   to  –5
Total 243 100
aEquity prices of companies in emerging markets are not available over the full sample period
used for the estimation horizon of the GVAR. We have a complete series for all ﬁrms only for
the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. For France, Italy, and Western Eu-
rope, although some of the series go back through 1979Q1, data are available for all ﬁrms
from 1987Q4 (France), 1987Q4 (Italy), 1989Q3 (Western Europe). For these regions the esti-
mation of the multifactor regressions are based on the available samples. For Latin America
we have observations for all ﬁrms from 1990Q2.
bThe sample contains a mix of Moody’s and S&P ratings, although S&P rating nomenclature
is used for convenience.available for the multifactor regressions. We allocated exposure roughly by
share of output of the region (in our “world” of twenty-ﬁve countries).
Within a region, loan exposure is randomly assigned. Loss given default is
assumed to be 100 percent for simplicity. Table 9.3 provides summary in-
formation of the number of ﬁrms in the portfolio by industry.
In order to obtain estimates for the rating-speciﬁc default frequencies
(  ˆR,T H⏐T), we make use of the rating histories from Standard & Poor’s,
spanning 1981–1999, roughly the same sample period as is covered by our
GVAR model. The results are presented in table 9.4for the range of ratings
that are represented in our portfolio of ﬁrms, namely     to  . Empiri-
cal default probabilities,   ˆR,T  , for   1, 2, . . . , H are obtained using de-
fault intensity-based estimates detailed in Lando and Skødeberg (2002)
and computed for diﬀerent horizons, under the assumption that the credit
migrations are governed by a Markov process (in our application, H   4
quarters). This assumption is reasonable for moderate horizons, up to
about two years; see Bangia et al. (2002). Since S&P rates only a subset of
ﬁrms (in 1981 S&P rated 1,378 ﬁrms of which about 98 percent were U.S.-
domiciled; by early 1999 this had risen to 4,910, about 68 percent in the
United States), it is reasonable to assign a nonzero (albeit very small) prob-
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Table 9.3 Portfolio breakdown by industry
Percentage of ﬁrms
Agriculture, mining, and construction 24 (9.9)
Communication, electric, and gas 45 (18.4)
Durable manufacturing 30 (12.3)
Finance, insurance, and real estate 71 (29.2)
Nondurable manufacturing 27 (11.1)
Service 6 (2.5)
Wholesale and retail trade 40 (16.4)
Total 243 (100)
Table 9.4 Unconditional default probabilities by rating
S&P rating Exposure share (%)   ˆ
 (T, T + 4)
    4.8 0.100 (0.005)
   17.6 0.372 (0.066)
  32.5 0.721 (0.234)
    27.7 10.69 (2.97)
   11.6 49.54 (5.72)
  5.8 353.61 (20.42)
Portfolio 100 29.42
Note: Exposure share and one-year-ahead probability of default (in basis points), exposure
weighted in parentheses, by credit rating. Based on ratings histories from S&P, 1981Q1–
1999Q1.ability of default, even if the empirical estimate is zero. This is particularly
relevant if we wish to infer default behavior for a much broader set of ﬁrms
than is covered by the rating agencies. With this in mind, we impose a lower
bound on the quarterly default frequency of 0.025 basis points per quarter
or 0.1 basis points per annum. As can be seen in table 9.4, this constraint is
binding only for the     rating. In this table we also show in parentheses
the exposure share by rating and the resulting expected loss (EL). Based on
the exposures in our portfolio, the (unconditional) expected default (or
loss under the maintained assumption of no recovery) over one year is
0.294 percent, or 29.4bp (basis points), bolded in the table.
9.5.2 Multifactor Return Regressions: Speciﬁcation, 
Estimation, and Selection
With the GVAR framework serving as the global economic engine, mul-
tifactor return regressions are speciﬁed in terms of the observed macro-
factors in the GVAR model. A general form of these return regressions is
given by equation (23). Given the diverse nature of the ﬁrms in our port-
folio, one is tempted to include all the domestic, foreign, and global factors
(i.e., oil price changes) in the multifactor regressions. Such a general spec-
iﬁcation may be particularly important in the case where a multinational is
resident in one country, but the bulk of its operations takes place in the
global arena. However, because there is likely to be a high degree of corre-
lation between some of the domestic and foreign variables (in particular
the domestic and foreign real equity prices), it is by no means obvious that
a general-to-speciﬁc model selection process would be appropriate, partic-
ularly considering the short time series data available relative to the num-
ber of diﬀerent factors in the GVAR.
An alternative model selection strategy, which we adopted in PSTW and
follow in this paper, is to view the 243 multifactor regressions as forming a
panel data model with heterogeneous coeﬃcients. Such panels have been
studied by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Smith, and Im (1996)
where it is shown that instead of considering ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates one
could base the analysis on the means of the estimated coeﬃcients, referred
to as the mean group estimates (MGE). This approach assumes that the
variations of factor loadings across ﬁrms in diﬀerent regions are approxi-
mately randomly distributed around ﬁxed means. This is the standard ran-
dom coeﬃcient model introduced into the panel literature by Swamy
(1970) and used extensively in the empirical literature.17 The choice of the
factors in the multifactor regressions can now be based on the statistical
signiﬁcance of the (population) mean coeﬃcients by using the MGE to se-
lect a slimmed-down regressor set.18
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17. A recent review of the random coeﬃcient models is provided by Hsiao and Pesaran
(2004).
18. The appropriate test statistics for this purpose are given in PSTW, section 6.This factor selection procedure, applied to the panel of 243 ﬁrms, led to
the following set of factors: changes in domestic or foreign real equity
prices, which we denote by  q ˜i,t 1, domestic interest rate (  i,t 1), and oil
price changes ( p0
t 1). We ran two sets of multifactor regressions (includ-
ing the interest rate and oil price variables); one with  qi,t 1 (the domes-
tic aggregate equity return variable), and another with  q∗
it (the foreign
country-speciﬁc equity return variable), and selected the regression with
the higher R  2. For three-quarters of the portfolio (183 ﬁrms) the domestic
equity market return was chosen. This fully heterogeneous return equation
(to be denoted as model M0) is given by
(35) rjis,t 1    jis    1,jis q ˜i,t 1    2,jis  i,t 1    3,jis p0
t 1   εjis,t 1,
where the idiosyncratic errors, εjis,t 1, are assumed to be i.i.d.N(0,  2
jis). As
credit rating information is used, default thresholds are computed using
equations (7) and (8), depending on whether we ﬁx DD or   by rating.
The summary of the ﬁnal set of multifactor regressions of equation (35)
and the associated mean group (MG) estimates are given in table 9.5. In
this speciﬁcation, changes in equity prices, interest rates, and oil prices re-
main the key driving factors in the multifactor regressions.
As is to be expected, the portfolio equity beta is highly signiﬁcant, but
somewhat below unity at 0.918. An increase in the rate of interest results in
a decline in ﬁrm returns, whereas the overall eﬀect of the oil price changes
is positive. This seems a reasonable outcome for energy and petrochemical
companies and for some of the banks, although one would not expect this
result to be universal. In fact, we do observe considerable variations in the
individual estimates of the coeﬃcients of oil price changes across diﬀerent
ﬁrms in our portfolio. In the ﬁnal regressions, of the 243 ﬁrm regressions,
the coeﬃcient on oil price changes was positive for 144 ﬁrms (about 59 per-
cent of the total), and negative for the remaining ﬁrms. The MGE for each
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Table 9.5 Mean group estimates (MGE) of factor loadings, heterogeneous
model (M0)
Standard error 
Factors MGE   ˆ of MGE SE(  ˆ) t-ratios
Constant 0.022 0.002 10.495
 q ˜ i,t+1 0.918 0.026 34.862
  i,t+1 –2.990 0.528 –5.663
 po
t+1 0.145 0.042 3.456
Average R2 0.238
Average R2 0.201
No. of ﬁrm quarters 17,114
Notes:  q ˜i,t+1 is equal to  qi,t+1 (domestic equity return) or  q* i,t+1 (foreign equity return), de-
pending on which yields a better in-sample ﬁt.   i,t+1 is the change in the domestic interest
rate;  po
I,t+1 is the change in oil prices.subset was also signiﬁcant. A pooled estimate would, of course, impose the
same factor loadings, in this case positive, on all ﬁrms.19
The lack of other observable systematic risk factors entering the return
model conﬁrms that most information relevant for ﬁrm returns is con-
tained in the contemporaneous market return. Only interest rates and oil
price changes provided marginal explanatory power. To be sure, when
forecasting the macroeconomic variables, and when conducting scenario
analyses, the dynamics of allthe variables modeled in the GVAR (all sixty-
three of them, plus oil prices) can still aﬀect returns through their possible
impacts on equity returns and interest rates. A direct presence in the ﬁrm-
return equation is not necessary for real output, for example, to inﬂuence
returns. Output shocks inﬂuence returns and credit losses to the extent that
real output, interest rates, and stock market returns are contemporane-
ously correlated.
In addition, to this fully heterogeneous speciﬁcation, we also consider 
a number of speciﬁcations with diﬀering degrees of slope and error vari-
ance heterogeneity, but based on the same three systematic factors ( q ˜i,t 1,
  i,t 1,  p0
t 1). We consider the following additional models.
M1 (Fully Homogeneous Model)
Pooled return equations with the same alpha and beta across all 243
ﬁrms in the portfolio:
(36) rjis,t 1      1 q ˜i,t 1    2  i,t 1    3 p0
t 1   εjis,t 1,
where the error variances are assumed to be the same for all ﬁrms, i.e.,  2
jis
   ε
2   jis.20
M2 (Firm Fixed Eﬀects)
This is the standard ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation:
(37) rjis,t 1    jis    1 q ˜i,t 1    2  i,t 1    3 p0
t 1   εjis,t 1,
where the error variances are assumed to be the same for all ﬁrms, as in the
model M1.
M3 (Industry/Sector Fixed and Marginal Eﬀects)
This model imposes the same intercept (alphas) and slopes (betas) within
an industry/sector but allows those parameters to vary across industries:
(38) rjis,t 1  ∑
S
s 1
 3SDs  ∑
S
s 1
 1sSDs q ˜i,t 1  ∑
S
s 1





t 1   εjis,t 1,
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19. Similarly for   i,t 1, 38 percent of ﬁrms actually have a positive coeﬃcient.
20. The parameters   and  i  are estimated by pooled OLS.where SDs is a sector dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for sector s
and 0 otherwise, for all t, i, and j. All ﬁrms within a given sector have the
same error variance, but those variances are allowed to vary across indus-
tries.
M4 (Region Fixed and Marginal Eﬀects)
In this model we impose the same intercept (alpha) and slope (beta)
within a region but allow those parameters to vary across regions:
(39) rjis,t 1  ∑
M
i 1
 iRDi  ∑
M
i 1
 1iRDi q ˜i,t 1  ∑
M
i 1





t 1    jis,t 1,
where RDi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for region i and 0
otherwise, for all t, s, and j. All ﬁrms within a given region have the same
error variance, but those variances are allowed to vary across regions.
Model M2 is arguably the simplest complication beyond a fully homo-
geneous model in that it allows ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (ﬁrm alphas) but still im-
poses the same error variance on all ﬁrms. Models M3 and M4 explore the
impact of parameter (mean and variance) heterogeneity by industry and
region, respectively.
Table 9.6 summarizes the regression results for the remaining models,
M1to M4. The equity factor loading is highly statistically signiﬁcant (1 per-
cent or better) across all models, and for the pooled models, with or with-
out a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, M2 (0.869) and M1 (0.865) respectively, the coeﬃ-
cient is close to the MG estimate for the heterogeneous model, M0 (0.918).
There is, however, considerable variation across industries (M3) and re-
gions (M4). For the industry model, the equity beta is lowest for communi-
cation, electric and gas, and nondurable manufacturing, both 0.752, and
highest for ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), 0.909. The sector eq-
uity beta closest to the pooled model is agriculture, mining, and construc-
tion, 0.889.
There is even more variation in the equity beta across regions, ranging
from a low of 0.622 for Latin America to a high of 1.926 for the Middle
East, represented in our portfolio simply by four Turkish ﬁrms, and so
should not be taken as typical.21 The second-lowest beta was estimated for
Italy, 0.663, and the second-highest for neighboring Germany, 1.165. Evi-
dently geographic proximity does not translate to similarity in equity
betas, at least not for our portfolio. Southeast Asia is closest to the pooled
beta at 0.842.
Turning now to interest rate sensitivity, recall that the MGE of the
442 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann, and Björn-Jakob Treutler
21. The Middle East region did not include a domestic equity variable, so all return equa-
tions for the Turkish ﬁrms include the foreign equity return variable,  q∗


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ainterest rate variable for the heterogeneous model is –2.990, meaning an in-
crease in interest rates has an adverse eﬀect on ﬁrm returns. This coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant for either of the pooled models, M1 and M2, and it has the
wrong sign. Allowing for variation across sectors, M3, results in signiﬁcant
and negative coeﬃcients for FIRE, –5.590, and wholesale and retail trade,
–3.711. Just one of the positive coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant: 3.402 for non-
durable manufacturing. Similar results are obtained in the case of Model
M4, where the interest rate variable is statistically signiﬁcant with a correct
sign only in case of U.S. ﬁrms (–5.974), the Turkish ﬁrms in the Middle
Eastern region (–6.676), and Southeast Asia (–5.454). Only one of the pos-
itive estimates is statistically signiﬁcant, although it is small, and that is for
Latin America, 0.111.
The coeﬃcient on oil price changes is signiﬁcant and positive for both
pooled models, M1 (0.063) and M2 (0.064), echoing the MGE for the 
heterogeneous model M0 (0.145). Recall, however, that the MGE of the
subgroups with positive and negative coeﬃcients were also signiﬁcant, sug-
gesting that ﬁrm-level heterogeneity for this factor loading may be partic-
ularly important. When grouping by industry or region, however, only the
positive coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. Indeed, in the industry/sector model,
the coeﬃcient of the oil price variable is signiﬁcant only for communica-
tion, Electric and Gas, at 0.113. In the regional model it is signiﬁcant for
several regions, including the United States (0.076), Germany (0.230),
Middle East (2.341), which is not surprising, and Latin America (1.035),
although the oil exporter Venezuela is not part of our Latin American re-
gion.
From a model ﬁt perspective, as measured by R  2, regional heterogeneity
is more important than industry heterogeneity: R  2   0.171 for the former
and 0.151 for the latter. Both are preferred to just adding ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
to the pooled model: the R  2 for M2 is 0.148. By comparison, the average R  2
for the heterogeneous model M0 is 0.201; see table 9.5.
Finally, we computed the average pairwise cross-sectional return corre-
lation across all ﬁrms in our portfolio as well as of the residuals for each 
of the return speciﬁcations, M0 through M4. The average pairwise cross-
sectional return correlation turns out to be about 11.2 percent. While this
may seem low for equity returns, note ﬁrst that returns are measured at rel-
atively low frequency—quarterly, and second that our portfolio is quite
well diversiﬁed, with ﬁrms from twenty-one countries grouped into ten re-
gions, and across all major industry groups. The three factors used in the
ﬁve model speciﬁcations are able to absorb a signiﬁcant amount of the
cross-ﬁrm dependence: the average residual correlation ranges from 3.7
percent to 4 percent across the models.
Another consideration in our comparative analysis is the extent to which
the ﬁve alternative parametric speciﬁcations aﬀect cross-section correla-
tions of the simulated returns. Since all of the ﬁve models are based on the
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 445same set of observed factors, cross-section correlations of the simulated re-
turns will be aﬀected signiﬁcantly by parameter heterogeneity only if the
diﬀerences of parameters across ﬁrms are systematic. In the case of pure
random diﬀerences across slopes, it is easily seen that all speciﬁcations
would imply similar degrees of error cross-correlations, and this is in fact
true in the present application.
9.6 Simulated Credit Loss Distributions
9.6.1 Unconditional and Conditional Loss
With the estimated GVAR model serving as the macroeconomic sce-
nario generator and the ﬁtted multifactor regressions as the linkage be-
tween ﬁrms and the global economy, we simulated loss distributions one
year ahead. We do this by ﬁrst forecasting, out of sample, the evolution of
the sixty-four GVAR risk factors, using those forecasts and the risk factor
loadings or return regression coeﬃcients to compute ﬁrm-return forecasts,
and then seeing if that return forecast falls below the default threshold. A
one-year horizon is typical for credit risk management and thus of partic-
ular interest. We carried out 200,000 replications for each scenario, base-
line as well as shock scenarios, using Gaussian innovations.
The estimation period ends in 1999Q1, and we generate the loss distri-
bution out of samples over one year to the end of 2000Q1. The year over
which the loss distribution is simulated turned out to have been relatively
benign for the ﬁrms in our portfolio when compared to the sample period,
which we use to compute unconditional parameters such as expected re-
turns and return volatilities. The unconditional one-year portfolio return
(i.e., the exposure-weighted average return of all ﬁrms in the portfolio) is
14.67 percent, while using the speciﬁcation for the fully heterogeneous
model M0, the conditional portfolio return projected for the forecast year
is 37.78 percent. This is reﬂected in the diﬀerence between conditional and
unconditional portfolio default (the same as expected loss under the main-
tained assumption of no loss recovery). Recall from table 9.4 that uncon-
ditional EL is 0.294 percent, but conditional EL under the default thresh-
old ( ) identifying assumption (8) is 0.096 percent, and under the same
distance to default (DD) assumption (5) is 0.089 percent.22 When we com-
pare the analytical to the simulated conditional portfolio default or ex-
pected loss, they are very close: 0.096 percent for same  and 0.087 percent
for same DD.
Fixing DD to be the same across ﬁrms by rating also ﬁxes the uncondi-
tional default probability; the two are isomorphic. Conditioning on return
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22. The diﬀerences between the latter two estimates are due to rounding error arising from
the inverse normal transform on very small probabilities.forecasts updates those probabilities. Fixing the default threshold   by rat-
ing, however, allows for heterogeneity in the unconditional default proba-
bilities; they just need to be the same on average (see the discussion in sec-
tion 9.2.2). Those, in turn, may be updated over time as conditioning
information is incorporated. This ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in unconditional
probabilities of default (PD) can make a big diﬀerence empirically, as is
seen in ﬁgure 9.1, which displays a scatter plot of unconditional (horizon-
tal axis) and conditional (vertical axis) one-year PDs for the 243 ﬁrms in 
the portfolio. The top panel is for the same default threshold ( ) by credit
rating for all ﬁrms, while the bottom panel is for the same DD by credit rat-
ing for all ﬁrms. The axes on both charts are scaled to be directly compa-
rable. We see immediately in the top panel that conditional and uncondi-
tional PDs are not only widely dispersed, reﬂective of the underlying
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, but also highly correlated (  0.961). By contrast,
the same DD by rating chart (bottom panel) has both the unconditional
and conditional PDs tightly clustered in a narrow range. As there are six
credit ratings represented in this study, so we see six vertical lines, where the
vertical scatter represents the variation in conditional PD by rating (all hav-
ing the same unconditional PD, of course) resulting in a lower correlation
between unconditional and conditional PDs (  0.790). In contrast to
same  , the PDs implied by same DD change dramatically through condi-
tioning (or updating). These diﬀerences will become more explicit and pro-
nounced in the loss distributions across the model speciﬁcations, an issue
we address next.
9.6.2 Model Heterogeneity and Baseline Losses
In moving from the most homogeneous model M1 to M2, we add het-
erogeneity in the conditional mean by allowing for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, as well
as heterogeneity in the unconditional probability of default, namely by in-
troducing credit rating information. To isolate the eﬀects of these relaxa-
tions of the homogeneity restrictions, we add an intermediate model, which
augments model M1 with credit rating information. Consequently we de-
note M1a to be the homogeneous model without the use of rating informa-
tion, and M1b the homogeneous model that allows for credit ratings in de-
termination of the default thresholds.
HPS provide theoretical results and empirical support showing that ne-
glecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to underestimation of expected
losses. But once EL is controlled for, neglecting parameter heterogeneity
can lead to overestimation of unexpected losses or risk. Their results are
not sensitive to the choice of identiﬁcation restrictions.
Table 9.7 gives summary statistics for the baseline (i.e., no risk factor
shocks) loss distribution for all models, with the top panel imposing the
same threshold,  , identifying restriction, and the bottom panel the same
distance to default, DD,restriction. We show the ﬁrst four moments as well
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 447Fig. 9.1 Scatter plot of unconditional (horizontal axis) and conditional (vertical
axis) one-year probabilities of default (PD) for 243 ﬁrms in portfolio 
Notes:Top panel: same default threshold (λ) by credit rating for all ﬁrms. Bottom panel: same



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.as three tail quartiles or values-at-risk (VaR): 99.0 percent, 99.5 percent
and 99.9 percent, corresponding to levels commonly used by risk man-
agers, and in the last case, the risk tolerance level of the New Basel Capital
Accord (BCBS 2004).
Looking ﬁrst at the top panel, EL and UL vary signiﬁcantly across the
diﬀerent speciﬁcations, both increasing as we increase model heterogeneity.
However, as shown in HPS, it is important that the diﬀerences in ELs across
the diﬀerent portfolios are taken into account before implications of het-
erogeneity for unexpected losses can be evaluated. There is no obvious way
that this can be done. Here we normalize risk, whether measured by unex-
pected loss (UL) or VaR, by EL. We shall refer to these as EL multiples.
The results in table 9.7 show that it takes about 21 EL multiples to ob-
tain one standard deviation of losses for the most homogeneous model
M1a, just eleven for the industry model M3, and only 2.5 for the fully het-
erogeneous model M0. The third and fourth moments, skewness and kur-
tosis respectively, also decline when more heterogeneity is allowed for.
Imposing homogeneity results in overly skewed and fat-tailed loss distri-
butions. This point becomes quite clear when looking at the 99.9 percent
VaR: model M1a and M1b have EL multiples in excess of 300, while the re-
gional model M4 has a multiple of only 54 and the fully heterogeneous
model M0 only 21, less than one-tenth of the most homogeneous model.
An important source of heterogeneity turns out to be the credit rating,
which inﬂuences, among other things, the default threshold. Adding credit
ratings to the homogeneous speciﬁcation, model M1b, results in a notice-
able drop in EL multiples: UL/EL drops from 20.8 to 17.1, and 99.9 per-
cent VaR from 382 to 305. Adding ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, model M2 does not
help; in fact, risk seems to increase slightly, although this could be due to
simulation errors. We need to allow for variation in factor loadings, either
by industry (model M3), or region (model M4), before EL multiples decline
further. These ﬁndings are in line with the results reported in HPS: the
factor that changes the shape of the loss density the most is the use of in-
formation on credit ratings in the construction of the loss distribution.
Considering that the New Basel Capital Accord is centered around more
careful modeling of credit ratings, either internal or external, this empha-
sis seems well placed indeed. A similar pattern holds when looking at Value
at Risk. In this regard, regional heterogeneity seems to play a more impor-
tant role than industry heterogeneity, perhaps not surprising given the in-
ternational nature of this portfolio.23
Turning to the bottom panel, where the loss distributions are simulated
under the same DD-identifying restriction, diﬀerences across model spec-
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23. We tried a diﬀerent industry speciﬁcation using ten instead of six groups to match the
number of parameters in the regional model (there are ten regions). This did not change our
conclusions.iﬁcations are much more muted. The results for the heterogeneous model
M0are broadly in line with its same  counterpart in the top panel (EL, UL,
and VaR are similar). However, EL decreases as we increase the degree 
of parameter heterogeneity. Moreover, there is little diﬀerence in EL mul-
tiples, whether looking at loss volatility (UL) or VaR. In fact, the results
would suggest that increased heterogeneity actually increases risk: UL/EL
for M1a is 1.4 and for M0 is 3.0. Further, 99.9 percent VaR, normalized by
EL, is 11 for M1a and 28 for M0.
These results diﬀer both from those under the same threshold-
identifying restriction and from those reported in HPS for the same DD re-
strictions. Under the same DD assumption, the actual default threshold
used in the simulations is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and is computed using ﬁrm-speciﬁc
estimates for unconditional expected returns and their standard deviations.
Since the sample period is short for several ﬁrms, we may have rather poor
estimates of the unconditional moments. The same   assumption implies
varying DDs (and hence unconditional PDs) across ﬁrms within a rating
category, although, importantly, they average out to match the rating-
speciﬁc unconditional PD. In the absence of reliable estimates of uncondi-
tional means and volatilities of ﬁrm returns, the resulting ﬁrm-speciﬁc de-
fault thresholds are likely to be rather noisy. In light of these results, and the
previous discussion of unconditional and conditional PDs, in the remain-
ing analysis we focus on the same threshold ( )-identify restrictions.
Before proceeding to the shock scenarios, it may be of interest to com-
pare the simulated UL to that implied by the Vasicek model, as discussed
in section 9.3. This asymptotic expression, given in equation (21), is driven
by the average default rate across the portfolio,  , and the default correla-
tion,  ∗, itself a function of   and the average return correlation of the
ﬁrms in the portfolio,  , which is 11.2 percent for our portfolio; see equa-
tion (20) in section 9.3. Thus, using the unconditional portfolio default rate
from table 9.4,   0.294 percent; this yields a default correlation of  ∗  
0.470 percent and an asymptotic UL     (1 –    ) ∗     0.371 percent,
which is above the simulated UL of all models. However, those simulated
ULs are conditional, not unconditional, and if we substitute the simulated
(conditional) EL (which, under the maintained assumption of no loss re-
covery, is identical to  ), all asymptotic UL values are below their simu-
lated counterparts, as they should be, assuming that the average return cor-
relation   remains unchanged. For example, in the case of model M0,   
0.094 percent, so that  ∗   0.208 percent. In that case, asymptotic UL  
0.140 percent, which is below the simulated UL of 0.239 percent. The
diﬀerence is clearly due to granularity, an issue we pick up in Section 6.5.
In ﬁgure 9.2 we compare the simulated loss distributions across model
speciﬁcations. The top panel displays the 20 percent tail (80th percentile
and beyond) and the bottom panel focuses on the 5 percent tail. The tail 
of that loss distribution rises earlier and more gradually for the most
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 451Fig. 9.2 Comparing the tail of the baseline loss distributions across models, 
same   identifying restriction by rating when rating information is used, 
200,000 simulations 
Notes: Top panel: 20 percent tail (losses beyond the 80th percentile). Bottom panel: 5 per-
cent tail (losses beyond the 95th percentile). Model M0 is fully heterogeneous model, M1a is
homogenous (no rating information), M1b is homogenous (with rating information), M2 is
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, M3 is industry ﬁxed and marginal eﬀects, and M4 is regional ﬁxed and mar-
ginal eﬀects.heterogeneous model, M0, and late and suddenly for the more homoge-
neous models. We see that the fully heterogeneous model in particular ac-
cumulates losses much earlier in the distribution, already by about the
82nd percentile, than the other models. Signiﬁcant losses are not seen un-
til about the 95th percentile for the regional model M4, not until after the
97th percentile for the industry model M3, and well beyond the 99th per-
centile for all other models.
9.6.3 Model Heterogeneity and Risk Factor Shocks
One of the main advantages of our conditional modeling approach is
that it allows us to consider the impact of diﬀerent macroeconomic or risk
factor shock scenarios. The ability to conduct shock scenario analysis with
observable risk factors is clearly important for policy analysis, be it busi-
ness or public policy.
Recall that the risk factors in the ﬁrm-return models are equity returns,
interest rates, and oil prices. In addition, we shall explore the impact of
business cycle heterogeneity across diﬀerent countries by considering
shocks to real output, which (as noted earlier) can inﬂuence the loss distri-
butions indirectly through their contemporaneous correlations with equity
returns and interest rates. Accordingly, we examine the following equi-
probable scenarios, though others, of course, are possible.24
• a  2.33  shock to real U.S. equity, corresponding to a quarterly
change of  14.28 percent from the baseline forecast25
• a  2.33  shock to the German short-term interest rate, correspon-
ding to a quarterly rise of 0.33 percent
• a –2.33  shock to real U.S. output, corresponding to a quarterly drop
of 1.85 percent
In order to learn more about the tail properties of the various loss dis-
tributions, we also consider an extreme stress scenario for the U.S. equity
market, as reported in PSTW, namely an adverse shock of 8.02 . This cor-
responds to a quarterly drop of 49 percent, which is the largest quarterly
drop in the S&P 500 index since 1928, which occurred over the three
months of March to May of 1932. Finally, we include an intermediate neg-
ative equity shock of –5 , which corresponds to a quarterly decline of 30.64
percent. Details of how the macroeconomic shocks are generated and how
they feed through ﬁrm returns to the loss distribution can be found in
PSTW.
We start the discussion with a  2.33 shock to real U.S. equity under the
same threshold,  , restriction, summarized in table 9.8. For each model we
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 453
24. 2.33  corresponds, in the Gaussian case, to the 99 percent VaR, a typical benchmark
in risk management.
25. Relative to historic averages, this shock corresponds to a rise (drop) of 17.95 percent





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.repeat the baseline results for ease of comparison and display the percent-
age increase (decrease) from that baseline of EL, UL, and 99.9 percent
VaR. For each model, the percentage increase in EL and UL arising from
the adverse shock is always larger than the corresponding decline in losses
due to a benign shock. Consider model M1a: EL (UL) increases by 172 per-
cent (73 percent) under the adverse shock and decreases by 67 percent (48
percent) under the benign shock. The size of those impact declines as we
allow for more heterogeneity. The regional model M4, for instance, shows
an increase in EL (UL) of 88 percent (42 percent) from the adverse shock,
against a decline of 46 percent (29 percent) from the benign shock. The
smallest impact can be seen from the most heterogeneous model, M0: the
adverse shock increases EL (UL) by 51 percent (31 percent), and the be-
nign shock decreases EL (UL) by 31 percent (21 percent).
This asymmetric and nonproportional response of credit losses to sym-
metric shocks is due to the nonlinearity of the credit risk model. When fo-
cusing on the tails of the loss distribution, however, only the fully hetero-
geneous model M0 exhibits this particular asymmetric response; namely,
that risk reductions are proportionately less than risk increases due to an
adverse and benign shock, respectively. For all other model speciﬁcations
the opposite seems to be true: the reduction in 99.9 percent VaR arising
from the benign shock is larger than the corresponding increase in 99.9
percent VaR due to the adverse shock. Thus, by imposing homogeneity,
not only are the relative loss responses exaggerated (all the percentage in-
creases and decreases are larger for the restricted than for the unrestricted
model), but perceived reduction in risk in the tail of the loss distribution
tends to be overly optimistic.
Finally, note that an adverse shock results in less skewed and fat-tailed
loss distributions, relative to their respective baselines, across all models;
conversely, a benign shock renders them more extreme. The advise (be-
nign) shock results in more (fewer) ﬁrms defaulting systematically due to
the displacement of expected (i.e., forecast) returns, before any additional
idiosyncratic risk is accounted for. As a result, an adverse (benign) shock
shifts probability mass of the loss distribution closer to (further from) the
mean. The eﬀects of the shocks on the shape of the loss distribution is quite
large for relatively homogeneous models, and much more modest for het-
erogeneous ones. For instance, the skewness (kurtosis) for M1adecreases to
19.4 (537) under the adverse shock compared to the baseline, 29.4 (1200),
but increases to 38.0 (1652) under the benign shock. By contrast, the skew-
ness and kurtosis decrease to 5.1 and 37.0, respectively, for the regional
model, M4, under the adverse shock scenario, as compared to the baseline
values of 6.5 and 56, but increases to 8.4 and 86.0 under the benign shock
scenario, respectively. The relative impact is, of course, even smaller for the
fully heterogeneous model, M0.
The evidence thus far suggests that heterogeneity is important in con-
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 455trolling risk, both under a baseline forecast and under shock scenarios. Al-
lowing for regional heterogeneity appears to be more important than al-
lowing for industry or sector heterogeneity. Both the baseline and shock-
conditional loss distributions seem to change noticeably with the addition
of heterogeneous factor loadings, that is, starting with model M3. However,
the biggest marginal change arises when allowing for full heterogeneity
with model M0.
Next we consider an adverse shock to German interest rates. Naturally,
we could have shocked interest rates of other countries, for example, the
United States, but since we already have other U.S.-based shock scenarios,
we wanted to broaden the discussion by considering shocks to other coun-
tries’ macroeconomic factors. Interest rate shocks are of particular inter-
est in our modeling context because the corresponding factor loading is
positive, but insigniﬁcant, for the pooled models M1 and M2, on average
negative and signiﬁcant for the heterogeneous model M0, and rather mixed
for the industry and regional models, M3 and M4.
The loss simulation results are summarized in table 9.9. Compared with
adverse U.S. equity shocks, the impact on credit losses due to an equiprob-
able adverse shock to German interest rates is more modest. EL increases
on average by only about 24 percent, UL by only 12 percent, and 99.9 per-
cent VaR by around 5 percent. Here too we see a similar model ranking as
before, with the most homogeneous model M1a being the most shock sen-
sitive, at least when measured by EL and UL impact, and the most hetero-
geneous model M0 the least shock sensitive. The impact on 99.9 percent
VaR is modest, and given parameter uncertainty, broadly similar across
the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
Even though the factor loading on interest rates is positive, albeit small
and not signiﬁcant, for the pooled models M1a, M1b, and M2, losses still in-
crease in reaction to an adverse interest rate shock. Because of the compli-
cated interdependencies that exist in the GVAR model, shocking one of the
factors will potentially impact all the other sixty-two factors. As a result,
the overall eﬀect of the shock on the loss distribution need not have the
same sign as the coeﬃcient of the factor in the return equation. Conse-
quently, an adverse interest rate shock may have the counterintuitive, be-
nign direct eﬀect on ﬁrm returns in the pooled return regressions, but the
intuitive adverse indirect eﬀects through the equity return factor.
With this in mind we consider the eﬀects of an adverse shock to real U.S.
output. Recall that output does not enter the ﬁrm-return regressions; how-
ever, shocks in output may enter indirectly through other variables, such 
as interest rates and equity prices. We summarize those results in table 9.10
and notice immediately that the changes from the baseline are of the
“wrong” sign, but quite small, and are unlikely to be statistically signiﬁ-
cant. One year after the shock, credit losses are projected to actually de-
cline somewhat. Average decline in EL across models is about 5 percent,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the decline in UL is about 3 percent, and the decline in 99.9 percent VaR is
about 2 percent relative to the baseline loss distribution. In section 9.6.4 we
explore whether including output directly in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc return re-
gressions makes any diﬀerence.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of extreme risk factor shocks on the re-
sulting distribution of credit losses under diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
Table 9.11 presents results from two diﬀerent U.S. real-equity shock sce-
narios: –5.00  in panel A, and –8.02  in panel B, the latter matching the
largest quarterly drop in the S&P 500 index since 1928. To be sure, a shock
as extreme as –8.02  is, of course, outside the bounds of the estimated
model. It would be unreasonable to believe that such a large shock would
not result in changes to the underlying parameters. However, it is still in-
structive to examine the impact of an extreme shock, as one way that one
might stress a credit risk model. Moreover, 5  events are more common at
higher frequencies than the quarterly data we have available to us indicates,
and because of this our results will likely underestimate the true loss out-
comes.
Under the –5  shock scenario, shown in panel A, increases in expected
losses across models range from eleven-fold (1035 percent); M2 to ninefold
(794 percent; M1a) to just 154 percent (M0). UL increases for the same
models are about three-and-a-half-fold for M1a (244 percent) and M2 (266
percent), and not quite double for M0 (85 percent). Diﬀerences in the tail
impact at the 99.9 percent level are not as extreme: 150 percent for M1a, 107
percent for M2, and 83 percent for M0. As the shock becomes more extreme
and takes the value of –8.02 , the diﬀerent shock sensitivities of the mod-
els, as measured, for instance, by 99.9 percent VaR, become even more ap-
parent (see panel B in table 9.11). Increases in VaR values relative to base-
line losses are less than 200 percent for models M0 and M4, and nearly 400
percent for model M1a. The broad pattern observed so far holds: the more
restrictive (homogeneous) the model, the more sensitively it reacts to shock
scenarios.
As the shock becomes more extreme to –8.02 , the resulting loss distri-
bution for all models becomes less skewed and fat-tailed, as measured by
kurtosis. To see this graphically we generated density plots for model M0,
presented in ﬁgure 9.3, where we display the simulated loss densities for the
baseline, the symmetric  2.33  shocks, and the two severe adverse shocks
to U.S. real equity prices. The ordering of the shocks is clearly seen in the
plot around the 1 percent portfolio loss point: from benign and lowest den-
sity to most adverse and highest density.
9.6.4 Business Cycle Shocks: An Alternative Model Speciﬁcation
The return regressions used in the previous simulation exercises do not
select the growth rate of real output as a risk factor. As noted earlier, this
might not be that surprising, as the eﬀects of business cycle ﬂuctuations on


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ﬁrm returns could have already been incorporated indirectly through mar-
ket returns. It is, however, possible that the factor selection and the subse-
quent model estimation could have been biased due to the use of country-
speciﬁc asset return variables, particularly in the case of countries with
relatively small asset markets.26
With this in mind, and following the work of Kapetanios and Pesaran
(2004), we proceed to estimate an alternative version of the fully heteroge-
neous model, which includes a global equity return,  q  t 1, deﬁned as the
cross-sectional average of all equity indexes in the GVAR model instead of
the country-speciﬁc market returns,  q ˜i,t 1, used in (35). We then run this
version of the return regression augmented with real output growth for re-
gion i, denoted by  yi,t 1, and the other variables, namely changes in inter-
est rates (  i,t 1) and oil prices ( p0
t 1).27
(40) rjis,t 1    jis    1, jis q  t 1    2,jis  i,t 1    3,jis p0
t 1    4,jis yi,t 1    jis,t 1
The mean group estimate (MGE) results for the alternative speciﬁcation
(40) using purchasing-power-parity (PPP) weights are given in table 9.12.
These new estimates attribute a smaller eﬀect to market returns, with the
average market beta falling from 0.918 to 0.780 and the interest rate eﬀects
rising (in absolute value) from –2.99 to –4.236. The average eﬀect of real
output growth on ﬁrm returns is also statistically signiﬁcant and has the
correct sign, which contrasts with the earlier results, based on country-
speciﬁc equity market returns. The average eﬀects of oil price changes, al-
though still positive, are no longer statistically signiﬁcant. The change in
the estimates as a result of using  q  t 1 instead of  q ˜i,t 1 are in line with a
priori expectations and could be explained by a positive correlation be-
tween the country-speciﬁc market returns and the errors in the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc return regressions. This is also reﬂected in the estimates of the in-
sample ﬁt of the return regressions where the average R  2 declines from
0.201 and 0.103 as we move from  q ˜i,t 1 to  q  t 1. The decline in the ﬁt is
quite substantial and could be an important consideration in the choice be-
tween the alternative speciﬁcations, although any simultaneity arising
from inclusion of  q ˜i,t 1 could in itself result in an upward bias in the aver-
age R  2.
Bearing in mind the uncertainty associated with these alternative speci-
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26. Recall that the estimates of the output eﬀects are obtained by regression of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
returns on the market returns, output growth, and other variables, such as changes in the in-
terest rates and oil prices. Since market returns are in eﬀect weighted averages of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc returns, the return regressions could yield biased estimates if the market return hap-
pens to be based on a relatively few ﬁrms.
27. This cross-sectional average may be either equal weighted or PPP weighted. We exper-
imented with both. In the latter case we used PPP weights from 1996, the same weights used
in the GVAR to construct regions from countries. There were little diﬀerences in the result,
and in what follows we focus on the estimates based on the PPP-weighted global real equity
index.ﬁcations, the loss simulations based on the new return regressions for the
baseline scenario as well as for the 2.33  shock scenarios are summarized
in table 9.13. These simulations can be viewed as providing a check on the
robustness of the loss-simulation results obtained so far. Baseline loss be-
havior is only somewhat diﬀerent from M0 (see last row of table 9.7, top
panel), but, importantly, it is closer than any of the other restricted mod-
els, even though their in-sample goodness of ﬁt was higher. When we ex-
amine the impact of shocks, even though real output now directly enters
the ﬁrm return regressions, the impact of an adverse shock to real U.S. out-
put growth is very similar to the previous speciﬁcation: it is both small and
of the wrong sign. Meanwhile, the impact of the other shocks is similar in
this as in the original speciﬁcation.
Although the average loading on output is positive, statistically signiﬁ-
cant, and large at 0.7, it turns out that about half (45 percent) of the ﬁrms
actually have a negative coeﬃcient (loading) on output. Indeed, when we
look at the MGE of the positive and negative subsets, they are both signif-
icant. Hence it is not surprising that for our portfolio the net impact of an
adverse shock to output is about zero. Of course, if the portfolio were com-
posed only of ﬁrms with a positive loading, credit losses would likely in-
crease in the event of an adverse output shock.
As far as loss distributions are concerned, our overall conclusions seem
to be robust to the choice of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc return regressions.
9.6.5 Idiosyncratic Risk and Granularity
Portfolio-level results of credit risk models such as those discussed in
Vasicek (1987, 2002) assume that the portfolio is suﬃciently large that all
idiosyncratic risk has been diversiﬁed away. More generally, we consider a
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Table 9.12 Mean group estimates (MGE) of factor loadings, heterogeneous model
(M0): Alternative speciﬁcation
Standard error
Factors MGE   ˆ of MGE SE(  ˆ) t-
ratios
Constant 0.010 0.003 3.075
 qt+1 0.780 0.031 24.874
  i,t+1 –4.326 0.520 –6.923
 po
t+1 0.041 0.038 1.064
 yi,t+1 0.700 0.260 2.695
Average R2 0.157
Average R2 0.103
No. of ﬁrm quarters 17,114
Notes: qt+1is the cross-sectional average of all equity indexes in the GVAR model using 1996
PPP weights.   i,t+1is the change in the domestic interest rate;  po
t+1is the change in oil prices;





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.credit portfolio composed of N diﬀerent credit assets, such as loans, each
with exposures or weights wi, for i   1, 2, . . . , N, such that the granularity
condition (22) holds. Recall that a suﬃcient condition for equation (22) to
hold is given by wi O(N–1).28The lower the average ﬁrm return correlation,
the greater the potential for diversiﬁcation, but a larger N is required to
attain that limit if correlations are lower. A common rule of thumb for re-
turn diversiﬁcation of a portfolio of equities is N 50. But as seen in section
9.6.2, default correlations are much lower than return correlations, meaning
that more ﬁrms are needed to reach the diversiﬁcation limits of credit risk.
Thus it seems reasonable to ask if a portfolio of N   243 is large enough
to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk. To answer this question we used an
empirical version of the one-factor Vasicek model (described in section
9.3) and analyzed the impact of increasing Non simulated compared to an-
alytic (asymptotic) unexpected loss (UL). For simulation purposes, Va-
sicek’s model takes the following form:
(41) rj,t 1   r     f ft 1    εεj,t 1,
where r    ΣT
t 1 ΣN
j 1 rjt/NT,
   ~ i.i.d.N (0, I2),
I2 is a 2-dimensional identity matrix,     f
2/( f
2    ε
2), and  f
2 is the vari-
ance of the market return. These parameters can be estimated as
(42)   ˆ f





(43)   ˆ ε
2   .
Loss is given by (19) with the return default threshold given by
(44)   r      f
2     ε
2    1( ).
For our portfolio, for the one-year horizon we have the following param-
eter values: r    13.356 percent,   ˆf   11.230 percent,   ˆε   34.856 percent,   ˆ
  0.294 percent, so that the implied average return correlation   9.404
percent, with an associated default correlation of  ∗   0.369 percent.29





j 1 (rjt   rt)2
   
NT   2
∑
T
t 1 (r   t   r)2
  
T   1
εj,t 1
ft 1
Global Business Cycles and Credit Risk 465
28. Condition (22) on the portfolio weights was in fact embodied in the initial proposal of
the New Basel Accord in the form of the Granularity Adjustments, which was designed to
mitigate the eﬀects of signiﬁcant single-borrower concentrations on the credit loss distribu-
tion. See Basel Committee (2001, chapter 8).
29. The relationship between   and  ∗ is given by equation (20).old of –87.51 percent, meaning that any ﬁrm that experiences a one-year
return worse than –87.51 percent would default.
Calibrating Vasicek’s model to these parameters we simulated losses as-
suming diﬀerent portfolio granularity, ranging from 119 to 10,000 ﬁrms.
To be sure, all ﬁrms share the same draw of the systematic factor f and the
same default threshold lambda, while each ﬁrm carries idiosyncratic risk
(reﬂected by ﬁrm-speciﬁc draws from εj,t 1 ~ N(0, 1). Idiosyncratic risk
should diversify away, with the simulated UL approaching the analytic UL
as the number of ﬁrms increases.
The results are summarized in table 9.14. The result for N   119 relates
to the number of ﬁrms in the PSTW portfolio. By more than doubling Nwe
cut idiosyncratic risk nearly in half. But to come within 3 percent of the
asymptotic UL of the portfolio, more than 5,000 ﬁrms are needed! Thus
credit portfolios or credit derivatives such as CDOs, which contain rather
fewer number of ﬁrms, will likely still retain a signiﬁcant degree of idio-
syncratic risk, an observation also made by Amato and Remolona (2004).
9.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have made use of a conditional credit risk model with
observable risk factors, developed in Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and
Weiner (2005), to explore several dimensions of credit risk diversiﬁcation:
across industries (sectors) and across diﬀerent countries or regions, either
in a relatively restrictive ﬁxed eﬀects return speciﬁcation, or by allowing 
for full ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁx the number of risk fac-
tors—there are three: market equity returns and changes in domestic in-
terest rates and oil prices—and only vary the degree of parameter hetero-
geneity across models. We ﬁnd that full ﬁrm-level parameter heterogeneity
matters a great deal for capturing diﬀerences in simulated credit loss dis-
tributions. Expected loss increases as more heterogeneity is allowed for.
However, unexpected losses, normalized by EL, decline dramatically.
Moreover, imposing homogeneity results in overly skewed and fat-tailed
loss distributions.
These diﬀerences become more pronounced in the presence of shocks to
systematic risk factors. The most restricted model, which imposes the same
factor sensitivities across all ﬁrms, is overly sensitive to such shocks, and
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Table 9.14 Impact of granularity using Vasicek model
Number of loans in portfolio (N)
119 243 1,000 5,000 10,000
Deviation from asymptotic lower bound (%) 80 44 12 3 2thus failing to properly account for parameter heterogeneity could result
in too much implied risk capital. Allowing for regional parameter hetero-
geneity seems to better approximate the loss distributions generated by the
fully heterogeneous model than just allowing for industry heterogeneity.
Our ﬁndings have a number of implications for both public and private
(or business) policy. For example, in the case of a bank’s risk management
practices, neglected heterogeneity resulting in underestimation of expected
losses would cause a bank to underprovision for (expected) losses. Fur-
thermore, the resulting overestimation of unexpected losses would cause a
bank to hold too much capital. Another example is the structuring and
pricing of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). These increasingly pop-
ular and widespread credit instruments are structured, and priced, by seg-
menting the loss distribution into risk tranches. We have shown that the
shape of the loss distribution is aﬀected signiﬁcantly under neglected het-
erogeneity, in which case the resulting pricing and risk assessment would in
turn be signiﬁcantly aﬀected. Related, our analysis shows that the size of
the portfolio needed to eliminate most of the idiosyncratic risk, and thus
fully exploit the diversiﬁcation potential that exists in credit portfolios,
may be in the thousands. This is sobering, considering that most CDOs
rarely contain more than 100 names. Finally, the relative insensitivity of
credit risk to business cycle shocks under alternative model speciﬁcations
could be important in the current debate over the procyclicality of the New
Basel Accord.
The results raise a number of questions and issues that merit further ex-
ploration. Our portfolio, by virtue of being allocated across twenty-one
countries in ten regions, is already quite diversiﬁed, as evidenced by an av-
erage cross-sectional pairwise return correlation of 11.2 percent. Concen-
trating all of the nominal exposure into just one region or one industry
would undoubtedly have a signiﬁcant impact on the resulting loss distri-
bution, in addition to yielding diﬀerences across models. A diﬃculty one
would quickly encounter in exploring this problem is the rating or default
probability diﬀerences across these dimensions. The average rating in the
United Kingdom, for instance, is much higher than for the Latin American
obligors, especially if one follows the rule that an obligor rating cannot ex-
ceed the sovereign rating.30
It is also worth exploring the impact of fat-tailed innovations on the re-
sulting loss distributions. The current application is limited to the double-
Gaussian assumption (both idiosyncratic and systematic innovations are
normal), but it seems reasonable to relax this assumption by consider-
ing, for example, draws from Student-t distributions with low degrees of
freedom.
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30. This rule seems quite reasonable when one considers debt denominated in, say, USD (or
euros), but perhaps less so if the debt is exclusively in the local currency.References
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At the most fundamental level, the authors’ work is motivated by the rec-
ognition that we know very little about what constitutes a good portfolio
credit risk model. Our models rely on highly imperfect estimates of obliga-
tion-speciﬁc default probabilities and default correlations. However, our
ability to test the performance of estimated default probabilities is limited,
and we have virtually no ability to test the out-of-sample performance of
default correlation models.1
In the absence of a good test of model accuracy, other factors necessar-
ily play important roles in determining which portfolio risk models we use.
These factors may include ease of application, the ability to undertake sce-
nario analysis, and transparency of results and interpretations.
One key aspect of any portfolio risk model that aﬀects its ease of use 
is the parameter heterogeneity it permits across ﬁrms. At one extreme, a
purely homogeneous portfolio risk model is commonly used to price (or at
least quote) synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches. This
copula model assumes that all ﬁrms share the same default intensity and
their default intensities share the same sensitivity to a single common
macroeconomic factor. At the other extreme, one can simulate (if not solve)
a completely heterogeneous model in which ﬁrms have diﬀerent default in-
tensities and diﬀerent intensity sensitivities to a wide array of systematic
risk factors. Allowing for such heterogeneity, however, not only compli-
cates the model, it potentially introduces considerable parameter estima-
tion error and reduces model transparency.
Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler address two major questions:
• What are the eﬀects on tail risk in a portfolio credit risk model of ﬁrm
heterogeneity with respect to ﬁrm-level default probabilities and de-
fault sensitivities to global macroeconomic, regional, and industry
risk factors?
• How does the inﬂuence of forecasts of the systematic risk variables
and shock variables on the conditional risk distribution vary with the
amount of ﬁrm heterogeneity incorporated into the model?
To answer these questions, the authors develop a portfolio credit risk
model, using real-world data with three components:
• A vector autoregression of the joint distribution of sixty-four global
macroeconomic variables for a set of twenty-ﬁve countries, account-
ing for about 80 percent of world output
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1. See Cantor and Falkenstein (2001) and Cantor and Mann (2003) and Lopez and Saiden-
berg (2000). One can, of course, test whether correlation models eﬀectively predict asset
prices, but it seems highly unlikely that there will ever be enough panel default data to test
whether our models correctly parameterize physical default correlations.• A model of ﬁrm-level equity returns for 243 ﬁrms as functions of
global macroeconomic variables and region and industry eﬀects
• A structural model of default, in which a ﬁrm defaults whenever its
stock price falls by an amount that depends upon the ﬁrm’s credit
rating.
Increased Parameter Heterogeneity and Tail Risk
Does tail risk increase or decrease with increased heterogeneity in ﬁrm-
level PDs or ﬁrm-level sensitivities to systematic factors? According to the
paper’s model the answer depends on which of two methods is used to iden-
tify each ﬁrm’s default equity threshold (table 9.6). The ﬁrst method (“the
same   method”), which assumes the default threshold depends only on
credit ratings, leads to the conclusion that tail risk declines as parameter
heterogeneity increases. The second method (“the same DD method”),
which assumes that a ﬁrm’s credit rating identiﬁes its equity-volatility and
drift-adjusted distance-to-default, leads to the opposite conclusion—in-
creased heterogeneity leads to greater tail risk.
Intuitively, I think heterogeneity should lead to smaller tail risk, since the
likelihood of all ﬁrms defaulting at the same time ought to decline as they be-
come more heterogeneous.I ﬁnd the paper’s ambiguous ﬁnding particularly
puzzling because I ﬁnd the rationale behind the same-DD method more
compelling than the rationale supporting the same-  method. Yet the DD
method seems to imply that increased heterogeneity somehow increases
tail risk.
Why? The answer probably lies in the fact that when the authors change
the degree of parameter heterogeneity they do not hold everything else
constant. In particular, when they increase heterogeneity, they do not keep
the portfolio’s expected loss rate constant. As modeled, increased hetero-
geneity sharply increases the portfolio’s expected loss rate under the same-
 assumption and sharply reduces it under the same-DD assumption (table
9.6). If the authors had managed to isolate an increase in heterogeneity
without changing expected loss rates, I suspect they would have unam-
biguously concluded that increased heterogeneity does reduce tail risk.2
If homogeneous models do systematically understate tail risk, then some
degree of model heterogeneity is likely worth the eﬀort. For example, the
simple copula models generally used to price synthetic CDO tranches are
likely to underprice senior tranches and overprice junior tranches.
Increased Parameter Heterogeneity and Sensitivity 
to Systematic Risk Factor Shocks
When discussing the sensitivity of the conditional portfolio risk distri-
bution to systematic shocks, the authors limit their analysis to the results
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2. This view appears to be conﬁrmed in a recent theoretical paper by two of the same au-
thors of this paper, along with another author. See Samuel Hanson, M. Hashem Pesaran, and
Til Schuermann (2005).that pertain to the same-  default threshold identiﬁcation method, which
does imply that greater heterogeneity reduces tail risk. In general, they ﬁnd
that conditional tail risk is less sensitive to systematic shocks under more
heterogeneous models. This ﬁnding is consistent with the intuition men-
tioned earlier. More heterogeneous portfolios are less likely to experience
nearly all ﬁrms defaulting at the same time. Similarly, adverse shifts in sys-
tematic risk variables are less likely to have a big impact on tail risk when
ﬁrm-default sensitivities to those risk factors are heterogeneous.
Other Results
In the course of developing these models, the authors derive at least two
other signiﬁcant results that may be of broad interest.
First, they ﬁnd that a greater portion of the correlation across ﬁrm stock
returns can be explained by common regional factors than by common in-
dustry factors. Considerable eﬀort in modeling can perhaps be saved if, in-
deed, industry factors can be safely ignored in modeling ﬁrm-equity corre-
lations. One should recognize, however, that the seven industry deﬁnitions
used in the paper are very broad. Many of the historically important in-
dustry concentrations—such as energy, telecom, casinos and hotels, real
estate, and retail—are not separately modeled.
Second, the authors ﬁnd that ﬁrm stock returns are strongly inﬂuenced
by regional and global stock market factors, oil prices, and (to a lesser ex-
tent) interest rates, but national gross domestic product (GDP) growth is
not important. GDP and other macroeconomic variables have some mod-
est impacts through their inﬂuence on broader equity market indexes, but
they do not have strong direct eﬀects on ﬁrm-level stock returns or ﬁrm de-
fault rates.
However, like other structural portfolio models that rely on ﬂuctuations
in equity prices to induce ﬁrm defaults, these models may underestimate
the eﬀects of macroeconomic risk factors on portfolio risk. In less restric-
tive models, the estimated eﬀects of GDP growth and other macroeco-
nomic variables on realized default rates tend to be more substantial.3
Model Structure Extremely Useful
Most credit risk portfolio models currently used in industry are not par-
ticularly well suited for scenario analysis and the calculation of conditional
risk distributions. Their underlying default correlations are usually derived
from asset correlations, equity correlations, or rating change correlations,
without direct reference to the underlying systematic risks driving those
472 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann, and Björn-Jakob Treutler
3. Carty (2000) ﬁnds in a hazard-rate model based on ﬁrm credit ratings, GDP growth, S&P
500 growth rates, and other variables, that GDP growth has a power eﬀect on default rates.
Duﬃe and Wang (2004), in a single-country (United States) model, also ﬁnd in a hazard-rate
model with a Merton-type distance-to-default risk measure, personal income growth, and
other variables, that personal income growth is highly signiﬁcant.correlations. In contrast, Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler have devel-
oped a three-module framework—with a macroeconomic VaR, an equity
return model, and an equity-price-based default model—that permits a
transparent separation of the distribution of systematic risk variables from
a credit portfolio’s conditional risk distribution. Other researchers and
market practitioners should ﬁnd this framework very useful.
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Discussion Summary
Darrell Duﬃe liked the idea of examining the impact of changes in model
assumptions on tail behavior, having previously observed that our under-
standing of tails of credit loss distributions is too limited. He suggested that
the model might be used to examine the impact of correlated measurement
error: if errors in estimation of individual-ﬁrm solvency or asset volatility
are correlated, actual tails will be much fatter than the tails measured by
currently popular portfolio credit risk models.
Much of the discussion revolved around technical issues. There was con-
siderable discussion of the authors’ methods of estimating rating transi-
tion matrices, with Til Schuermann responding that their modiﬁcation of
Lando’s method addresses the concerns. Torben Andersen suggested that
recent upgrades and downgrades are informative and might be incorpo-
rated into estimation, and Schuermann agreed.
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